Today, as we enter the 50th year of the Sino-Indian war, which uncovered gaping lacunae in India’s defence preparedness and strategic priorities, the conditions are far-off from being congenial, with the arrangement being that of “constrained cooperation”. While on the face of it, India and China have in place a cordial bilateral relationship with burgeoning economic cooperation (which is heavily tilted in Beijing’s favour), deep down wide fissures threaten to upstage the relationship. Given that till date there is no mutually agreed upon Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries, sporadic incidents of border transgressions appear to be a covert Chinese strategy of asserting its claims in the Western Sector, especially in north-eastern Ladakh. Similarly, in the Eastern Sector too, the LAC is not physically demarcated on the ground, including that on military maps. India is faced with a two-lane highway built by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to drive up to the border in this sector. There is no way India can hope to match China’s military power in the foreseeable future. Further, as evidenced by her past actions, China is unlikely to be dissuaded by the niceties of ‘soft power’ alone. The best India can hope to do therefore is to deter China from engaging in military aggression. And for that, the Indian armed forces have to conceive a strategy that would achieve that end within the means at hand, and organise accordingly. This book will definitely prove to be a boon to teachers, students and research scholars.